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The dominant response to Peter Singer’s defense of an extremely demanding 
duty of aid argues that an affluent person’s duty of aid is limited by her moral 
entitlement to live her own life. This paper argues that this entitlement provides 
a basis not for limiting an affluent person’s duty of aid but rather for the claim 
that she too is wronged by a world marked by widespread desperate need; and the 
wrong she suffers is a distinctive one: the activation of a duty of aid so 
demanding that it dominates her life, crowding out her own valuable projects and 
involvements. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Peter Singer’s argument in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” (1972) begins 
with certain of our secure moral convictions about the duty of rescue—as 
exemplified by the case of the child drowning in a shallow pond—and, in just a 
few steps, arrives at an extremely demanding duty of the relatively affluent 
person to aid those in desperate need overseas.1 Indeed, Singer’s duty of aid is so 
demanding that it seems to leave no space in such a person’s practical life for her 
own projects and involvements; she is instead morally little more than an agent 
of rescue. For many, this claim is unbelievable and so it must be that Singer’s 
argument goes awry somewhere. Arguably the dominant diagnosis of how it 
does so focuses on this fact that Singer’s duty of aid leaves no space for the 
relatively affluent person to live her own life, and the claim is that the duty of aid 
simply cannot demand this much of her, for she has a moral entitlement to live 
her own life that limits what such a duty can demand. Singer’s argument goes 
	
1 For the argument, see Singer 1972: 231-236. For a similar account, see Unger 1996. Who gets 
counted among the ‘relatively affluent’? For this discussion, we do not need anything particularly 
precise and so the following should suffice: people with the time and money to spend on things 
beyond basic needs or, as Garrett Cullity (2004: 7) puts it, “people like you and me.” 
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awry, on this view, by failing to properly recognize the moral importance of 
persons having the space to live their own lives.2 
This paper challenges this dominant response to Singer’s argument by 
offering an alternate account of the moral entitlement to live one’s own life, one 
compatible with Singer’s defense of an extremely demanding duty of aid. On this 
alternate account, defending a duty of aid so demanding that the relatively 
affluent person lacks the space to live her own life, as Singer’s account does, is 
nevertheless compatible with properly recognizing the moral importance of 
having the space to live one’s own life. This is because it can be true that the duty 
of aid is as demanding as Singer’s argument claims—or, as I’ll put it, that the 
duty thoroughly dominates a person’s possibilities for action—and yet also true 
that it ought not be the case that it is this demanding, for the affluent person has 
a moral entitlement to live her own life. On this account, then, something has 
indeed gone awry. But it is not Singer’s argument that has gone awry—it may be 
sound and so the conclusion true—but rather the circumstances of our world that 
make it the case that the duty of aid demands so much of the affluent person.3 
Indeed, insofar as the various social, political, and economic institutions 
structuring our world are responsible for widespread and persistent desperate 
need, and so for the fact that the duty of aid demands so much of the relatively 
affluent person, we can say that she is wronged by the fact that it demands this 
much, for she has a moral entitlement to live her own life. And so, instead of 
serving as a basis for limiting the duty of aid, this moral entitlement picks out yet 
another individual wronged by a world containing widespread and persistent 
desperate need: the relatively affluent person. And the wrong she suffers is a 
distinctive one: the activation of a duty of aid so demanding that it thoroughly 
dominates her life, crowding out her own valuable projects and involvements 
and, in that way, turning her into morally little more than an agent of rescue. 
The aim of this paper is thus not to mount a full-fledged defense of Singer’s 
argument.4 Its aim is a narrower one, namely to show that, if Singer’s argument 
does go awry, it will not be because, as the dominant response claims, it is unable 
to properly recognize the moral importance of having the space to live one’s own 
	
2 Examples include Cullity 2004, Hampton 1993, Herman 2007, Miller 2004 and 2010. 
3 Elizabeth Ashford (2003: 292) makes this point, specifically about contractualist and utilitarian 
accounts of the duty of aid: “The extreme demandingness of both contractualist and utilitarian 
obligations to those in need is not an objection to either view, I suggest, but an appropriate 
response to morally salient features of the current state of the world.”  
4 That said, I agree with David Enoch (2011: 193) when he remarks that he “do[es] not know of any 
convincing argument” showing that Singer’s (and Unger’s) core argument is mistaken. 
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life. Singer’s argument can affirm that persons are morally entitled to the space to 
live their own lives while also asserting that, given the circumstances of our 
world, the duty of aid nevertheless dominates them, depriving them of this space 
to which they are entitled.  
The paper pursues this narrower aim in two parts. First, it presents and 
argues against what is arguably the most sophisticated version of the dominant 
response to Singer’s argument, namely the one defended by Garrett Cullity in 
The Moral Demands of Affluence (2004). Cullity observes that an argument like 
Singer’s implies radical changes to our commonsense conception of beneficence, 
and he argues that among the changes it implies—perhaps the most radical and, 
for him, the least plausible one—is the claim that persons’ interests in living their 
own lives are not morally important. However, as I’ll show, Cullity is mistaken 
here, for Singer’s argument does not actually imply this particular change. The 
paper then goes on to offer a sketch of how accounts like Singer’s can take 
seriously the moral importance of having the space to live one’s own life—and, 
in fact, can regard it as a moral entitlement—while at the same time defending a 
duty of aid so demanding that it means that one doesn’t have that space. In 
doing this second thing, the paper makes a larger point about how we might 
think about the apparent conflict between the moral importance of personal 
pursuits and the demandingness of moral duty, one that will apply to more than 
just duties of aid. 
2. SINGER, CULLITY, AND THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF LIVING YOUR 
OWN LIFE 
Singer’s argument takes what Cullity calls “an iterative approach” to the 
question of a person’s duty of aid. According to this approach, for each person in 
desperate need that can easily be helped, I must contribute to the effort to help 
them unless the cost to me of this contribution is by itself large enough to justify 
refusal. That I may have already contributed a great deal to help others does not 
matter for my duty to help this further person, only whether the additional cost 
to me of helping this further person itself isn’t too great. As Cullity (2004: 87) 
observes, we can understand beneficence as “concern for others’ interests” but 
we must read this description extensionally: “In a situation where someone’s life 
can be saved, a beneficent person’s reason to help him will be that he needs help, 
and not that this action furthers the interests of other people.” From this Cullity (2004: 
87) sketches the case for the iterative approach: 
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What considerations can sensibly be treated as countervailing against this 
reason? A countervailing consideration is one that shows why, if you 
refuse to help, you should not be faulted for being insufficiently 
concerned to act on this reason. But it is hard to see how what you have 
done for others in the past can help show this. If a beneficent person’s 
reason to help is his need, how can considerations about what you have 
done for others be relevant to whether your concern to act on this reason 
is sufficient for beneficence? 
On the iterative approach, then, whatever cost I may be required to bear to help 
save another’s life, beneficence requires that I bear that cost for “the thousand-
and-first person” I can help save just as it requires me to do so for the first 
person.  
The result of the iterative approach is what Cullity (2004: 78-79) calls ‘the 
Extreme Demand’: 
The Extreme Demand. I am morally required to keep contributing my time 
and money to aid agencies (or to some other comparably important 
cause), until either: 
(a) there are no longer any lives to be saved (or comparably important 
goals to be achieved) by those agencies, or 
(b) contributing my share of the cost of our collectively saving one 
further life (or doing something comparably important) would itself 
be a large enough sacrifice to excuse my refusing to contribute. 
In a world like ours, a world of widespread and persistent desperate need, my 
duty of aid will not be limited by (a)—no matter how many I help, there will be 
more persons in desperate need that I can help—and so I must keep contributing 
until I reach the limits in (b). When might I reach those limits? It is difficult to see 
how the incremental sacrifice of any of my personal pursuits—sacrificing, say, 
going to a movie, buying a book, or taking my partner out to dinner—could 
justify refusing to help save a life, and so, on the iterative approach, I must 
repeatedly make that incremental sacrifice so long as there are further lives to 
help save.5 While there is some question as to precisely how demanding the 
Extreme Demand thus ends up being, Cullity (2004: 80, 85) concludes quite 
	
5 It is thus not enough merely to do your fair share to aid those in desperate need. So long as there 
remain persons in desperate need, you must continue to contribute in order to help them, even if 
they are in desperate need only because some other relatively affluent persons are failing to do 
their fair share. See Cullity 2004: 76-77. 
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plausibly that it “seem[s] to allow me to spend practically no time or money on 
my own personal fulfillment” and, as such, “it calls for the wholesale 
abandonment of almost all of our everyday lives.” And this does seem to be 
where Singer (1972: 238) himself thinks his argument leads. 
a. The moral importance of living your own life 
A common reaction to Singer’s argument—arguably the dominant one—is 
that something has gone awry, that it cannot be, as the Extreme Demand has it, 
that the relatively affluent person is morally little more than an agent of rescue. 
Behind this reaction, I think, is what I’ll call the Basic Thought:  
The Basic Thought: It is a matter of considerable moral importance that 
persons have the space to live their own lives.6 
By ‘space to live her own life’ I mean that the boundaries and constraints of 
morality—what she morally must or must not do—do not consistently narrow a 
person’s possibilities for action to such an extent that her own valuable projects, 
involvements, or relationships—generally, who and what she cares about—
cannot, without running afoul of morality, play an independent and substantive 
role in her deliberations about what she is to do.7  
The Basic Thought is related to what Barbara Herman (2007: 204) identifies as 
an “independent current in our moral understanding,” one which concerns “the 
relation of fit between morality and ordinary life: that whatever morality 
requires of us, it should not make our lives unlivable, or too severe.” That said, 
the Basic Thought’s underlying concern isn’t with the demandingness of 
morality, where demandingness is a matter of the cost or difficulty of 
compliance.8 It is rather with whether morality allows a person space for the 
exercise of her freedom, where freedom is understood along the lines of John 
Stuart Mill’s (2003: 160) “[t]he only freedom which deserves the name is that of 
	
6 This formulation of the Basic Thought, which aims to capture the core idea motivating the 
dominant response to Singer, is not uncontroversial. For instance, you might reject the thought that 
the overdemandingness of impartial morality might itself be a moral problem and opt instead for 
the view that, while impartial morality can indeed be extremely demanding, you are rationally 
permitted to live your own life rather than meet those extreme demands. This is the sort of view 
defended, for instance, by Susan Wolf (1982). I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on 
this.  
7 I am assuming here that the valuable pursuits in question are not in themselves immoral. 
8 For discussion of the relevance of cost and difficulty to the question of moral demandingness, see 
McElwee 2016.  
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pursuing our own good in our own way.” Granted, Mill is concerned with the 
threat to this pursuit posed by social and legal coercion while the Basic 
Thought’s focus is on the threat posed by the demands of morality. But it does 
seem that morality can pose a threat to freedom understood in this way, and we 
might call this threat domination by duty. A person is dominated by duty when 
the demands of morality overly narrow her possibilities for action, perhaps even 
deciding her course of action altogether and, in doing so, leave little to no room 
for her to “pursue her own good in her own way.” Of particular concern here is 
when a person is thoroughly dominated by duty, when she must be little more 
than an agent of morality for sustained stretches of time.  
Confronted with Singer’s argument and its endorsement of the Extreme 
Demand, we might develop the Basic Thought into the claim that persons have a 
moral entitlement to live their own lives that limits domination by duty. This is 
essentially what Cullity’s account does: “It is reasonable for me to have a policy 
of contributing towards helping others that allows me to retain a defensible 
engagement with my own projects, relationships, and other life-enhancing 
goods” (Cullity 2004: 191). And this emerges most clearly when Cullity (2004: 85) 
considers what he calls “the nightmare scenario” in which “everywhere I went I 
directly encountered people needing my life-saving help, in practically unlimited 
numbers, and each of whom I could save at small cost.” About this scenario, 
Cullity (2004: 85) claims that, compared to the Extreme Demand, it is “[s]urely 
[…] more intuitively attractive” to hold that it would be morally permissible for 
me to “spen[d] my mornings saving people’s lives, perhaps, and my afternoons 
having a life of my own.” He thus does not deny that the duty of rescue can still 
be fairly demanding (I must spend my mornings saving lives, after all). But, even 
so, his view is that a person’s entitlement to live her own life justifies a hard limit 
on what her duty to aid others in desperate need can demand of her whether she 
encounters those others directly—as in the nightmare scenario—or not—as in 
our current world. 
In his discussion of so-called Moderate views of the duty to aid, of which 
Cullity’s account is one, Brian Berkey usefully distinguishes between 
‘Moderation about Principles’ and ‘Moderation about Demands.’ The former, 
Moderation about Principles, holds that morality does not demand that we 
always take everyone’s interests into account equally; rather, we may reasonably 
attach importance to our own valuable pursuits—projects, involvements, 
relationships, etc.—beyond what attaches to them from an impartial perspective 
(Berkey 2016: 3020, 3026). And the latter, Moderation about Demands, holds that 
“in circumstances like ours, morality is not significantly [or, dramatically] more 
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demanding […] than common-sense morality takes it to be” (Berkey 2016: 3020). 
Berkey (2016: 3021) observes that, although Moderate views characteristically 
incorporate both, it is not obvious that Moderation about Principles will imply 
Moderation about Demands; on the contrary, 
it seems not merely conceptually possible, but also quite intuitively 
plausible, that appealing versions of Moderation about Principles might, 
when applied to well off people in a world like ours, imply demands that 
far exceed those that proponents of Moderation about Demands are 
willing to accept. 
As Berkey (2016, 3022-3024) notes, there is ample reason to suspect that our 
intuitions, about particular cases of rescue, that we are not required to make very 
large or very costly sacrifices are not reliable.9 This presents a problem, he 
argues, for those Moderate accounts that, on the basis of these intuitions, build 
into their version of Moderation about Principles a commitment to Moderation 
about Demands instead of making the case for their version of Moderation about 
Principles independently of these intuitions (with Moderation about Demands 
then following from the case that’s been made). Berkey (2016: 3026-3033) points 
to Samuel Scheffler’s and Richard Miller’s accounts as examples of Moderate 
accounts that make this kind of mistake.10  
I suspect, however, that the appeal of Moderation about Demands, 
particularly when considering the implications not of a one-off case of rescue 
requiring a very large sacrifice but rather, as in Singer’s argument, of an 
indefinitely long series of rescues requiring sacrifices that, though individually 
small, are cumulatively very large, rests not simply on intuitions about cases, 
intuitions of which we have reason to be skeptical, but also on the Basic Thought. 
The core worry about Singer’s account is that morality’s demands of the 
relatively affluent person over time would deprive her of space sufficient (on any 
reasonable understanding of ‘sufficient’) for living her own life, and that they 
would do so seems straightforwardly incompatible with the claim that it is itself 
morally important that she have that space. On this view, then, the Basic 
Thought implies Moderation about Demands: persons have moral entitlements 
	
9 Berkey appeals to Peter Unger’s arguments in Living High and Letting Die (1996) and, in particular, 
to Unger’s claim that, as Berkey (2016: 3023) puts it, “in cases in which a large number of people are 
in need, and their needs are not salient to us (for example, they are deeply impoverished people in 
a distant country), we will tend to have the intuition that we are not obligated to sacrifice in order 
to aid them because we will tend to be in the grip of what [Unger] calls ‘futility thinking.’” 
10 For the accounts in question, see Scheffler 1992: Chs. 6-7; Miller 2004; and Miller 2010: Ch. 1.   
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to live their own lives that limit domination by duty. Additionally, the Basic 
Thought may serve as a bridge of sorts between Moderation about Demands and 
Moderation about Principles, for, if an argument denies the Basic Thought—as 
Singer’s, on this view, does—then that argument does not allow a person to 
attach sufficient importance to her own valuable pursuits to make for a plausible 
version of Moderation about Principles. A defensible Moderation about 
Principles, on this view, will thus need to incorporate a moral entitlement to live 
one’s life that limits domination by duty and, in doing so, it will imply 
Moderation about Demands. This is essentially what Cullity’s particular 
Moderate account does. 
b. Cullity’s argument against the Extreme Demand 
The argument Cullity offers against the Extreme Demand is, as he (2004: 128) 
calls it, “an argument from the presuppositions of beneficence.”11 When we take 
ourselves to be under requirements of beneficence to help others, we accept that 
those others’ interests give us compelling moral reasons to help them. That we 
do so is important, Cullity (2004: 128) argues, because “in accepting this, we are 
making presuppositions from which it follows that acting out of partiality 
towards our own interests is not wrong.” If beneficence requires me, say, to pay 
the subway fare for someone on their way to audition for Julliard, then it must 
not be wrong of them—and would not be wrong of me—to pursue a career in 
music performance. But, the Extreme Demand says that, in our current world, it 
is wrong to act out of partiality towards one’s own interests—Extremism, not 
Moderation, about Demands—and so it must also reject the various everyday 
requirements of beneficence that we intuitively take ourselves to have. Thus, if it 
is in fact wrong to pursue a career in music performance, then it cannot be that 
I’m required by beneficence to pay that subway fare. That it rejects these 
everyday requirements of beneficence, Cullity argues, is a problem for the 
Extreme Demand. 
Cullity’s argument (2004: 130) starts by observing that many goods—
relationships and personal projects, for instance—are ones that “essentially 
involve personal partiality.”12 But, in our current world, the Extreme Demand 
	
11 See also Cullity 2009.  
12 And, as Cullity (2004: 130) explains, “[t]he attitude of personal partiality I bear towards my 
friends and projects is a matter of taking them to justify my acting a certain way, out of proportion 
to the impartial value of acting that way.” 
	 9 
requires that I live “an altruistically focused life” by “constricting my pursuit of 
my own fulfillment as much as I bearably and usefully can, for the purpose of 
contributing to helping others” (Cullity 2004: 133). The Extreme Demand thus 
claims that it is wrong for me to live “a non-altruistically-focused life” (Cullity 
2004: 137). With this established, the argument then appeals to the following 
principle:  
When your interest in having (or doing) a certain thing is an interest in 
having (or doing) what it would be wrong of you to have (or do), that 
interest cannot be a good reason for morally requiring me to help you to 
get (or do) it. (Cullity 2004, 138)  
The Extreme Demand has it that our interests in the fulfillments of a non-
altruistically-focused life are interests in things it is wrong for us to have (or 
do). According to this principle, it is thus committed to the view that those 
interests cannot give rise to requirements of beneficence on the part of others 
to help us. But, Cullity (2004: 137) argues, it is “absurd” to deny that a 
person’s interests in the fulfillments of a non-altruistically-focused life can 
provide us with reasons to help her: 
[I]t seems no less obvious that it would be wrong to refuse to make a 
small effort to reunite a long-parted family than that it would be wrong to 
refuse to make a small effort to save someone’s life. If these are moral 
requirements of beneficence, but there cannot be requirements of 
beneficence to help people get [or do] what it is wrong to have [or do], 
then having the fulfillments of a non-altruistically-focused life cannot be 
wrong. The Extreme Demand says that it is wrong. So the Extreme 
Demand should be rejected.  
Or, more precisely, the Extreme Demand should be rejected unless and until we 
are given a justification for the radical revisions to our conception of 
beneficence—which interests of others do or do not matter for what beneficence 
requires of us in our world—that it implies. Without such a justification, “we 
should not take the Extreme Demand seriously” (Cullity 2004, 142).  
The Extreme Demand has it that it is wrong to live a non-altruistically-
focused life. Cullity (2004: 142) thinks that, as a result, it is committed to claiming 
not only that others’ interests in living their own lives do not give us morally 
compelling reasons to help them do so but also that they do not give us such 
reasons because those interests are not important enough to entitle those others 
to the moral space to do so. He thus regards the Extreme Demand as committed 
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to the rejection of the Basic Thought. Cullity (2004: 141-142) also holds, 
unsurprisingly, that this makes the Extreme Demand incompatible with a 
plausible version of Moderation about Principles, for, as he puts it, the Extreme 
Demand asks that we make “drastic” revisions not just to what beneficence 
actually requires of us but also to “our firm conception of what is morally 
important”; it claims, he says, that “many of the things that we think are morally 
important are not.” Since the things at issue are presumably the fulfillments of a 
non-altruistically-focused life, Cullity’s claim here is that, by holding that it is 
wrong to live a non-altruistically-focused life and thereby rejecting the Basic 
Thought, the Extreme Demand is committed to the view that the fulfillments of 
such a life are not morally important. And this would seem to rule out a 
defensible version of Moderation about Principles whereby the importance 
persons may attach to their personal pursuits, beyond what attaches to them 
from an impartial perspective, actually matters practically.  
c. Why Cullity’s argument against the Extreme Demand fails 
Cullity’s argument against the Extreme Demand fails. Consider the 
conditional in the earlier passage:  
If these are moral requirements of beneficence, but there cannot be 
requirements of beneficence to help people get [or do] what it is wrong to 
have [or do], then having the fulfillments of a non-altruistically-focused 
life cannot be wrong.   
The conditional’s antecedent is false because Cullity’s principle—contained in 
the second half of the antecedent—is mistaken. Even when your interest in 
having (or doing) a certain thing is an interest in having (or doing) what would 
under the circumstances be wrong for you to have (or do), that interest can 
nevertheless be a good reason for morally requiring me to help you get (or do) it. 
This is because one way to help another on account of such an interest is to 
change the circumstances such that it is no longer wrong for them to have (or do) 
the thing in question. And so, the defender of the Extreme Demand can affirm 
what Cullity rightly takes to be obvious—others’ interests in the fulfillments of a 
non-altruistically-focused life can give us requirements of beneficence to help 
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them—even while also asserting that living such a life is, under the 
circumstances, wrong.13  
Consider Cullity’s (2004: 192) example of your interest in keeping your suit 
clean. If your suit is about to get dirty—“You haven’t noticed that it is about to 
slip off the coathanger you are carrying, and I could point this out without being 
a busybody or treating you like a child”—it seems clear that I am required by 
beneficence to help you in this way. But, as Cullity (2004: 192) observes, this is 
the case only if it is morally permissible for you to keep your suit clean:  
If saving someone’s life directly means dirtying your suit, then you are 
morally required to dirty your suit. And if I know this, I am obviously not 
required to help you avoid dirtying your suit when it means letting 
someone die. 
The key phrase here is “when it means letting someone die.” Let’s assume such a 
case of rescue. Even though the circumstances are such that you saving another 
person’s life requires that you dirty your suit, it may be open to me to change 
those circumstances so that it becomes morally permissible for you to keep your 
suit clean. How might I do this? Perhaps, when I come upon you about to rescue 
this person, it’s clear that I could easily step in and save them myself. Until I’ve 
stepped in, it is wrong for you to avoid dirtying your suit—you must save 
them—but, when I step in, my doing so makes it the case that it is no longer 
wrong for you to avoid dirtying your suit. By saving this person, I obviously 
help them. But it seems quite natural to say that, by saving them, I help you as 
well, and the help I provide you by saving them is help keeping your suit clean. 
In this sort of case, then, your interest in keeping your suit clean can be a good 
reason for morally requiring me to help you by stepping in and saving the 
person myself, even though this interest is an interest in doing something that, 
until I step in, is wrong for you to do. Cullity’s principle denies this and so it 
fails.14   
	
13 Of course, that it affirms this still commits the defender of the Extreme Demand to the view that 
many of the everyday requirements of beneficence we think obvious are not actually genuine 
requirements, but, as I’ll argue later, the justification for this is much easier to give than the sort of 
justification Cullity mistakenly argues must be given. 
14 Someone might wonder whether this claim—that your interests can make it that I am morally 
required to step in and save the person myself—is compatible with the claim that, until I actually 
do step in, you are morally required to save that person. I think so, for reasons similar to the 
standard response to Liam Murphy’s fair share account of the duty of aid: in cases of rescue, that 
some other is failing to do what they’re morally required to do—they aren’t rescuing the person—
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This is admittedly a special case. But it is an apt one when thinking about the 
Extreme Demand, for its claim is that living a non-altruistically-focused life is 
wrong not because of anything inherent in the activities of that life—none of 
them, it’s assumed, are in themselves wrong—but because of the circumstances 
in which I would live such a life. As a result, the Extreme Demand’s stance here 
does not imply that others cannot have a reason to help me live a non-
altruistically-focused life, for my interests in living such a life, along with others’ 
similar interests, can still give them morally compelling reason to change the 
circumstances in which so many people are in desperate need and so require 
aid.15 Our mistake about the requirements of beneficence, according to the 
Extreme Demand, thus isn’t about which interests of others can or cannot give us 
morally compelling reasons to provide them with help; it’s rather about what 
kinds of help, in the circumstances of our world, those interests can give us 
reasons to provide, the specific requirements of beneficence that they can give 
rise to. What others’ interests in living non-altruistically-focused lives can give us 
morally compelling reason to do is not to help them live those lives in our world 
as it is—for, in this world, their doing so is wrong—but it is rather to help them 
by realizing a world in which it would not be wrong for them to live such lives. 
As this makes clear, the Extreme Demand does imply a radical revision to 
our common-sense understanding of what beneficence requires of us. Cullity is 
certainly correct about this. And this revision requires justification, particularly 
because, as Cullity (2004:142) notes, the case for the Extreme Demand relies on 
our commonsense judgments about what beneficence requires in certain cases of 
rescue while at the same time it rejects “the equally obvious-seeming judgments 
we make about almost all of the further everyday requirements of beneficence 
that we recognize.” What’s required, then, is an account of why the former set of 
judgments are more credible than the latter set. But, if my argument so far is 
correct—if the Extreme Demand does not deny that others’ interests in the 
fulfillments of a non-altruistically-focused life are morally important and so can 
give us morally compelling reasons to help them—then what is not required is an 
account that argues, as Cullity (2004: 142) claims, “for a radically revised 
conception of beneficence […] that drastically restricts the range of interests that 
can ground requirements of beneficence.” The problem with the latter set of 
judgments isn’t that the interests at issue cannot ground any requirements of 
	
can make it the case that you are morally required to do it instead. For Murphy’s fair share account, 
see Murphy 1993. For the standard response, see Singer 1972: 232-234, and Cullity 2004: 75-76. 
15 Of course, those in desperate need also have interests in living such lives, interests that will give 
these others additional morally compelling reasons to do this.  
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beneficence at all. The problem is rather that, in our world as it is, those interests 
do not in fact ground many of the particular requirements of beneficence in that 
latter set of judgments, ones that we take to be obvious; they may instead ground 
other, much less obvious requirements. 
What the Extreme Demand claims, then, is that we have been 
misunderstanding the radical implications of our world as it is, a world in which 
there are always persons offstage, as it were, in desperate need, each of whom 
we can help at small cost to ourselves. What justifies this claim of widespread 
misunderstanding? Largely it’s that, in our everyday lives, these two facts—that 
these others need help and that we can help them at little cost to ourselves—are 
simply not made salient to us but rather kept hidden offstage. As a result, they 
do not enter into our moral assessments of those everyday situations where 
someone not in desperate need but in front of us—someone onstage, as it were—
needs our help. We do not consider, for instance, whether what they need help 
with is, in the circumstances, actually wrong for them to have (or do) because 
what makes it wrong—that having (or doing) it means not helping someone in 
desperate need—is offstage, not part of the situation as we perceive it. Nor do we 
consider that the choice we face is between helping this person in front of us 
onstage or helping others in desperate need offstage. Our judgments about 
everyday requirements of beneficence—and, in particular, the fact that we take 
these judgments to be obvious and so absurd to deny—depend on our blindness 
to these facts and so to the actual moral contours of the situations at issue. Our 
judgments about rescue, on the other hand, do not. 
Put another way, in our everyday interactions with others, we are not 
confronted by the fact that the situation is actually one of moral emergency—or, 
more precisely, one of an indefinite series of moral emergencies—rather than one 
of ordinary moral life.16 A marker of ordinary moral life, we might say, is that 
persons have the moral space to pursue the fulfillments of a non-altruistically-
focused life; as a result, ordinary moral life includes the everyday requirements 
of beneficence that we take to be obvious. That I continually misunderstand the 
circumstances as those of ordinary moral life is why my judgments about these 
	
16 As Elizabeth Ashford (2000: 430) puts the point, “the source of the extreme demandingness of 
morality is that the current state of the world is a constant emergency situation.” And this is true 
not just for a utilitarian account of the duty of aid. Martin Sticker and Marcel van Ackeren (2018: 
407) point out that the notion of emergency operates similarly in Kant’s ethics: “emergencies play a 
significant role for Kantian duties of beneficence and they outweigh many other morally significant 
concerns, including those pertaining to our own happiness.” They suggest that, given the realities 
of global poverty, a Kantian account should find a very demanding duty of aid. 
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everyday requirements of beneficence come to seem absurd to deny, as obvious 
to me as my judgments about what beneficence requires in cases of rescue. But, 
when I think of the circumstances as instead those of a series of moral 
emergencies, the radical implications of the Extreme Demand not only for what 
beneficence requires of us but also what it does not require of us, while still 
surprising and even shocking, do not strike me as absurd.  
Consider again Cullity’s (2004: 85) nightmare scenario “in which everywhere 
I went I directly encountered people needing my life-saving help, in practically 
unlimited numbers, and each of whom I could save at small cost.” What does 
beneficence require of me in this world? Suppose we’re in this scenario together; 
you’ve decided that, because you have your own life to live, you’ll spend some 
of your time—your afternoons, after mornings spent saving lives—learning the 
violin rather than rescuing those you might encounter during that time. Would I 
have the same requirements of beneficence, during our afternoons at least, to 
help you with this personal pursuit that I would have were our world one of 
ordinary moral life? It is not at all clear to me that I would, and the reasons why 
are those that would lead one to the Extreme Demand: first, it’s far from clear 
that learning the violin is something that, in these nightmare circumstances, you 
do have the moral space to do; and, second, my choice would be between 
helping you or saving another life, and it’s far from clear that my reasons to help 
you could outweigh the reasons I have to save that life. When I try to imagine 
myself in this nightmare scenario, it does not seem absurd to deny that I will 
have those everyday requirements of beneficence towards you that in better, 
non-nightmare circumstances, would seem entirely obvious. 
3. DOMINATION BY DUTY AS A MORAL WRONG 
Nevertheless, when we are led to the conclusion that morality makes the 
Extreme Demand of us and, in that way, regards us as little more than agents of 
rescue, it is difficult to resist the thought that something has gone awry, for we 
have our own lives to live (and, as Cullity’s argument emphasizes, everyday 
requirements of beneficence towards one another to fulfill). And so, we still 
confront the core question of whether Singer’s account, because of its 
endorsement of the Extreme Demand, must deny the Basic Thought. It seems to 
me that it need not deny it, for the claim that it is wrong to live a non-
altruistically-focused life is compatible with the claim that it is of considerable 
moral importance that persons have the space to live such a life and, indeed, that 
we are morally entitled to such space. In other words, it can be true both that 
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morality makes the Extreme Demand of us and that, for the reasons captured by 
the Basic Thought, it ought not be the case that morality makes that demand of 
us. There is no contradiction here.  
On this account, the Basic Thought concerns not how dominating duty can be 
but rather how dominating duty may be. And so, when we are led to the 
conclusion that morality makes the Extreme Demand of us, what has gone awry 
may not be the argument—it may be sound and so the conclusion true—but 
rather those circumstances of our world that make it the case that morality does 
what it ought not do, which is to make this demand of us. When our world is 
such that morality does make the Extreme Demand of us, this fact will itself be 
deeply morally objectionable precisely because ordinary moral life ought to be 
possible for us. In this way, our conviction that we are entitled to ordinary moral 
life, as captured by the Basic Thought, may not give us grounds to reject the 
Extreme Demand; rather, it may make possible a separate and itself powerful 
moral indictment of our current world.  
a. Domination by duty 
To begin, consider (what might initially seem far afield) Michael Walzer’s 
account of why launching a war of aggression is a moral crime. Walzer (1977: 27) 
claims that, in modern war, the vast majority of soldiers, even the volunteers, are 
compelled to fight. As he explains: 
[T]he more a soldier fights because he is committed to a ‘common cause,’ 
the more likely we are to regard it as a crime to force him to fight. We 
assume that his commitment is to the safety of his country, that he fights 
only when it is threatened, and that he has to fight (he has been ‘put to 
it’): it is his duty and not a free choice. 
There are two relevant ideas here: there is some distinction to be made between 
acting out of duty and acting freely, and there can be something objectionable 
about a situation in which a person has a duty that, were he to recognize it as 
such, will decide his conduct for him.   
A fully free decision to fight, Walzer (1977: 28) explains, would be “a 
personal choice that the soldier makes on his own and for essentially private 
reasons,” but this kind of personal choice “effectively disappears as soon as 
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fighting becomes […] a patriotic duty.”17 Consider the soldier who enlists out of 
duty to his country. Walzer‘s claim is that, upon recognizing this duty, he cannot 
do otherwise but enlist when his country is threatened by invasion—that is what 
his duty demands—and so his choice here, in an important sense, is not a free 
one. What Walzer is pointing to, it seems, is that the soldier’s duty to defend his 
country, when activated by invasion, dominates his possibilities for action, 
crowding out his other responsibilities, projects, relationships, and involvements. 
The freedom at issue here, then, is the freedom that concerns the Basic Thought 
and is threatened by the Extreme Demand. 
What is troubling about the situation of even the volunteer soldier is that, 
once his duty to defend his country is activated by an unjust invasion, he loses 
the space to live his own life: there is nothing he can do but leave his home, his 
family, and his community—indeed, virtually all of his valuable projects and 
involvements—in order to enlist in the fight. And so, by activating this duty and 
thereby depriving him of the space to live his own life, an unjust invasion harms 
him, and, crucially, he suffers this harm prior to any actual fighting. (This harm 
is thus distinct from any of the obvious psychological and bodily harms a soldier 
is liable to suffer in war.) Indeed, we might go so far as to say that the activation 
of this duty by the aggressor country, because the duty now thoroughly 
dominates him, violates his moral entitlement to live his own life and thus 
wrongs him. Crucially, that he is wronged in this way doesn’t change the status 
of this thoroughly dominating duty to fight for his country: it remains what 
morality demands of him. And so, morality can dominate him in this way even 
though it ought not be the case that it does so. In fact, we cannot understand the 
harm he suffers, and how it is a wrong done to him by the aggressor country, 
unless the duty that dominates him remains in force.  
Walzer’s discussion shows that one can wrong another by activating for them 
a duty that thoroughly dominates them, depriving them of the space to live their 
own life, space to which they are morally entitled. But it’s possible to wrong 
another not by activating for them a thoroughly dominating duty but rather by 
failing to ensure that some duty, when it’s activated for them, is not activated in 
such a way that it thoroughly dominates them.18 Imagine, for example, finding 
yourself, at age 20, suddenly the sole caretaker of a cognitively and/or physically 
disabled sibling (or parent). How dominating is your duty of care here? Possibly 
	
17As Walzer (1977: 28) points out, there will be intermediate positions between fighting as a 
completely free choice and fighting as wholly compelled by a sense of duty. 
18 I thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing the importance of this distinction. 
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quite dominating. But how dominating it actually is will depend on the society in 
which you live and, in particular, on the social services that its institutions take 
responsibility for providing. For instance, if you live in a society with a minimal 
welfare state (call it “Alabama”), your duty of care will likely be much more 
dominating than if you live in a European-style social democratic state (call it 
“Norway). Why is this? Because the decisions that Alabama has made mean that 
you are much more on your own as your sibling’s caregiver than you would be in 
Norway.  
In Alabama, you might find that you’re morally required to get a steady and 
decently-paying but mind-numbingly boring job so that you can afford the sort 
of care your sibling requires; perhaps this will require cutting your education 
short, perhaps it will require foregoing your career dreams—you were planning 
to be a musician—or your dream of living overseas. These sacrifices won’t be a 
one-off thing but a continual demand, one that will require you to radically scale 
back or give up entirely many of your own pursuits. In Norway, you might find 
that you need not cut your education short or compromise your career dreams 
very much, if at all—you can still be a musician, say—because your sibling 
qualifies for various state programs that finance and deliver a substantial portion 
of her care. What your duty of care requires in Norway is that you be her 
advocate, making sure she gets the care for which she qualifies. Of course, this 
may still be demanding: you may have to fight with various agencies and 
bureaucracies, you will need to monitor the care she gets (perhaps caregiving 
staff are undertrained, overworked, under-resourced, and/or underpaid, with 
unsurprising results). In Alabama, then, your duty to care for your sibling will 
likely be quite dominating, leaving you with little moral space to live your own 
life while, in Norway, it will leave you with substantial moral space to live your 
own life.  
In Alabama, then, that you are on your own is a morally significant harm you 
suffer. But does Alabama thereby wrong you? I think it quite plausibly does. We 
can understand the moral entitlement to live one’s own life along the lines of 
Henry Shue’s (1980: 13) account of moral rights:  
A moral right provides (1) the rational basis for a justified demand (2) 
that the actual enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against 
standard threats. 
Shue (1980: 33) says, about the third component, that “[t]he social guarantees… 
need not provide impregnable protections against every imaginable threat, but 
they must provide effective defenses against predictable remediable threats.” 
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Domination by familial duties of care is a standard threat to our enjoyment of the 
space to live our own lives, and, since we are entitled to such space, we may 
justifiably demand that our enjoyment of it be socially guaranteed against such a 
threat. And so, while your duty of care can demand as much as it does in 
Alabama, it not only ought not be that case that it does so but you may justifiably 
demand that, as in Norway, it not do so. Indeed, we might say that justice 
requires that Alabama see to it that it doesn’t demand that much, for it must 
concern itself here not only with your sibling and the care she needs but, because 
you are morally entitled to live your own life, also with you and the burdens you 
will bear as a caregiver. In failing at this task, Alabama—or, more precisely, the 
persons and institutions within Alabama responsible for this failure—wrongs 
you.19 
b. Domination by duties of aid 
It is by appealing to this phenomenon of domination by duty, I suggest, that 
an account such as Singer’s, one that endorses the Extreme Demand, can accept 
and accommodate the Basic Thought’s claim about the moral importance of 
persons having the space to live their own lives. On this view, the circumstances 
of our world activate for the relatively affluent person a duty of aid that is so 
demanding that it thoroughly dominates her, making it wrong for her to pursue 
the fulfillments of a non-altruistically-focused life; but, that she finds herself in 
circumstances that activates such a duty wrongs her, for she is morally entitled to 
the space to live her own life. But wronged by whom? By those responsible for 
the fact that the global institutional order not only fails to prevent such 
widespread desperate need but also fails, when it emerges, to respond to it 
effectively, for these failures together are what make the duty of aid, when 
activated for the relatively affluent person, thoroughly dominating.  
Granted, this may seem like not much of an answer. But we do not need to 
perform the exceedingly difficult task of parceling out this responsibility among 
institutions and persons making up the global order in order to defend the claim 
that the relatively affluent person is wronged. To see why, consider one of the 
basic rights Shue (1980: 20-22) discusses, the right to security. In a society that, 
	
19 Of course, it still may be that, in Norway, you decide to become your sibling’s full-time caregiver. 
What’s important, I think, is that you not find yourself forced to make that decision by the 
circumstances being such that becoming her full-time caregiver is the only way for you to fulfill 
your duty of care.  
	 19 
say, fails to secure for members of a minority group their rights to security, it 
likely will be quite difficult to parcel out responsibility for this failure. Certainly, 
the justice system itself—the police and courts—will be partly responsible, but so 
will the governmental elites that set security policies and priorities. 
Responsibility will also extend to those with influence over those governmental 
elites, perhaps this will be economic or social elites, perhaps it will be the wider 
public (or certain large segments of it). It may even be that the individual efforts 
at self-protection that some members of this minority group take contribute to 
their overall lack of security.20 But even if this responsibility remains to be 
parceled out, the claim that those persons whose rights to security the state fails 
to secure are thereby wronged seems uncontroversial, for this claim requires 
nothing more than (a) that they could be secured and (b) that no other morally 
compelling interest competes with securing it such that the failure to do so, 
though regrettable, is justified.   
In our case, then, the claims that we require are (a) that persons’ basic rights 
to subsistence could be secured—that, as Shue (1980: 64) puts it, institutions that 
prevent or avoid situations “in which people are confronted by subsistence-
threatening forces they cannot themselves handle” are possible—and (b) that no 
other morally compelling interest competes with securing those rights such that 
the failure to do so, though regrettable, is justified. These relatively 
uncontroversial claims together get us that the widespread and persistent 
desperate need in our world is a moral failure of the global institutional order. 
For Shue, of course, this means that that this institutional order wrongs those in 
desperate need, for their basic rights to subsistence are not secured (Shue 1980: 
22-29, 55-60). But it also wrongs the relatively affluent person who, as a result of 
this failure, finds herself with a duty of aid so demanding that it thoroughly 
dominates her, for her moral entitlement to life her own life is not secured.  
At this point, you might wonder whether it makes sense to cast the relatively 
affluent person as a fellow victim of the global institutional order. If the global 
institutional order “foreseeably and avoidably (re)produce[s]” such desperate 
need, then, as Thomas Pogge (2005: 42) argues, it would seem that “the better-
off… are harming the worse-off” by upholding such an order. They will have 
demanding duties towards the worse-off, but they can hardly count themselves 
thus also as victims of the global order. Or, if the American empire has 
	
20 This is likely to be the case if this minority lives in segregated communities. And this would 
make the question of responsibility even more complicated, for those responsible for the 
segregation will bear some responsibility for the lack of security. 
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domineering influence over the global order, then, as Richard Miller (2010: Chs. 
5-7) argues, it would seem that Americans, along with citizens of its close allies, 
have a special responsibility for the injustice of that global order. Here again, 
they will have demanding duties towards the worse-off, but those who 
participate in the project of maintaining and extending the American empire—as 
many relatively affluent citizens do, to varying degrees—can hardly count 
themselves thus also as victims of the global order.21  
Significantly, neither Pogge’s nor Miller’s arguments result in duties so 
demanding that they thoroughly dominate the relatively affluent person. For 
Pogge (2005: 36), the duties that arise for the better-off are ones “to seek to reform 
these institutions [of the global order] and to do our fair share toward mitigating 
the harms they cause.” For Miller (2010: 209, 182), it is “the duty to seek ways to 
hem in the immoral excesses of the American empire” but only insofar as “this 
political endeavor is not especially costly.” Now, it is true that to whatever extent 
widespread and persistent desperate need is the result of the relatively affluent 
not fulfilling these various duties, they are to that extent responsible for the 
failure of the global order to secure persons’ basic rights to subsistence. But this 
does not undermine the claim that, because this failure of the global order—a 
failure for which the relatively affluent person is herself only to a very small 
extent responsible—activates for her a duty of aid so demanding that it 
thoroughly dominates her, it thereby wrongs her.  
c. Domination by duty and ordinary moral life 
On the account I’ve sketched, when a person finds herself in circumstances 
where her moral duty thoroughly dominates her, it may be that her moral 
entitlement to live her own life has been violated and so that she has been 
wronged. But, even so, the duty nevertheless remains in force: it is what morality 
requires of her, even though it is morally wrong that it does so. In such a case, 
the fault may lie with the institutions that failed to prevent those circumstances 
from arising, for they are responsible for creating the circumstances in which 
people have the space to live their own lives. We might say, then, that persons 
have a claim of justice against the institutions governing their world that those 
institutions secure for them not only their basic rights to security and subsistence 
	
21 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
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but also this moral entitlement by preventing those circumstances in which their 
duties come to thoroughly dominate them.22   
These concerns about domination by duty are particularly pressing when it 
comes to clear cases of moral emergencies—cases of rescue or of helping another 
in desperate need—for these are cases that strike us as ones where you simply 
must help the other, even if doing so has large costs to your pursuit of whatever 
projects you might have. When such moral emergencies are rare, that duty 
dominates your actions during one doesn’t pose much of a problem for your 
ability to live your own life, for while a particular emergency can be quite 
constraining, perhaps even foreclosing the pursuit of some particular project 
entirely, you will still be able afterwards to go back into ordinary moral life in 
which morality doesn’t dominate your actions. But that these sorts of moral 
emergencies are rare is in large part a matter of the circumstances in which you 
find yourself. And what’s notable about such emergencies is that the strength of 
your duty to respond to an emergency, when you encounter one, seems 
independent of your history of emergency-response: as the iterative approach 
emphasizes, that you’ve already rescued other people seems irrelevant to the 
strength of your duty to rescue this person now. This means, then, that it is at 
least possible for your actions to be thoroughly dominated by duty were you to 
find yourself continually encountering such emergencies, with the result being 
that you become morally little more than an agent of rescue.  
Even so, there is something morally unthinkable about a situation like 
Cullity’s nightmare scenario where we are unable to enjoy ordinary moral life 
because we find ourselves in a continual procession of moral emergencies. And 
this, I think, is because the notion of ordinary moral life isn’t merely one where 
emergencies happen to be statistically rare; rather, ordinary moral life is the 
product of institutions responsible for making it the case that such emergencies 
are rare. Ordinary moral life is thus a normative notion, a vision of the sort of 
social world morality demands that, via our institutions, we collectively achieve. 
This is, in the end, what the Basic Thought captures. Morality demands that 
ordinary moral life be achieved in our world not only because of the importance 
to us that we not be in desperate need, and so require rescue, but also because of 
the importance to us that the burdens we bear as rescuers not be too excessive, 
	
22 That the social-democratic welfare states of Europe have gone the furthest in fulfilling this 
responsibility, at least domestically, and thus count as a particular moral achievement is a 
prominent theme of the historian Tony Judt’s Postwar (2005). 
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where excessive here is measured by whether we have the moral space to live 
our own lives.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Suppose that Singer’s argument, with its endorsement of the Extreme 
Demand, is sound. In the circumstances of our world, sincere reflection on 
certain of your secure convictions of ordinary morality—ones concerning the 
duty of rescue—should lead you to conclude that you have an extremely 
demanding duty of aid, one that, were you to live up to it, would thoroughly 
dominate your life. The power of Singer’s argument isn’t that you will be 
convinced to at least try to live up to the demands of the duty of aid it finds for 
us. It predictably hasn’t had anything like that effect, even among those who 
suspect the argument is sound.  
On the account I’ve defended here, the power of Singer’s argument is rather 
to reveal that our world is arranged in such a way that the only way that we can 
go about living our own lives is if we contrive to forget that the time and money 
we spend on our own projects and involvements could, if we only decided to use 
them that way, contribute to saving another person’s life. For were we to think 
about it, a very simple argument commits us to an extremely demanding duty of 
aid, one that, were we to fulfill it, would keep us from living our own lives. In 
this way, what Singer’s argument, if it is sound, shows is that the circumstances 
of our world are actually not those of ordinary moral life and so, just as in 
Cullity’s nightmare scenario, you cannot be confident that you can live your own 
life and be a morally decent person. But ordinary moral life is an entirely 
reasonable thing for you to want; indeed, it is something to which you’re morally 
entitled. This, again, is what the Basic Thought captures. As a result, if you’re to 
live your own life in our current world, you must develop a kind of moral 
blindness: you must allow yourself to use the distance between you and those in 
desperate need to keep them out of mind—you and those near to you are onstage 
while they are offstage—thereby enabling you to believe that the circumstances 
of your world are those of ordinary moral life rather than those of an ongoing 
series of moral emergencies. That you are put in this sort of position is one way 
in which you are wronged by the institutions governing our world.  
On this account, then, the Basic Thought does not provide a way to limit the 
duty to aid those in desperate need, as the Moderate critics of Singer’s argument 
claim. Rather, the Basic Thought points to an additional class of persons who are 
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wronged by a world marked by widespread desperate need: the class of morally 
conscientious affluent persons. And the wrong they suffer is a distinctive one: the 
activation of a duty of aid so demanding that it thoroughly dominates the 
person’s life, crowding out her own valuable projects and involvements and, in 
that way, turning her into morally little more than an agent of rescue. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am grateful to Richard W. Miller, Michelle Kosch, Rochelle Duford, Nathaniel 
Jezzi, and Sara Streett for their comments and criticisms, as well as to two 
anonymous reviewers for this journal. I also thank audiences at Lehigh 
University and the University of Delaware, to whom I presented earlier versions 
of the argument contained in this paper. 
REFERENCES  
Ashford, Elizabeth. 2000. “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality” Journal of 
Philosophy 97.8: 421-439. 
----- 2003. “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism” Ethics 113: 273-302. 
Berkey, Brian. 2016. “The demandingness of morality: toward a reflective 
equilibrium” Philosophical Studies 173: 3015-3035 
Cullity, Garrett. 2004. The Moral Demands of Affluence. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
----- 2009. “Demandingness and Arguments from Presupposition” The Problem of 
Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays, Timothy Chappell, ed. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
David Enoch. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hampton, Jean. 1993. “Selflessness and Loss of Self” Social Philosophy and Policy 
10.1: 135-165. 
Herman, Barbara. 2007. “The Scope of Moral Requirement” Moral Literacy. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Judt, Tony. 2005. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. New York: Penguin.  
McElwee, Brian. 2016. “What is Demandingness?” The Limits of Moral Obligation: 
Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can, Marcel van Ackeren and Michael 
Kühler, eds. New York: Routledge. 
Mill, John Stuart. 2003. On Liberty in The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill, 
John Troyer, ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers. 
	 24 
Miller, Richard W. 2004. “Beneficence, Duty and Distance” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 32: 357-383. 
----- 2010. Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Murphy, Liam B. 1993. “The Demands of Beneficence” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 22: 267-292 
Pogge, Thomas. 2005. “Real-World Justice” Journal of Ethics 9.1-2: 29-53. 
Scheffler, Samuel. 1992. Human Morality. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shue, Henry. 1980. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence and Morality” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1: 229-243. 
Sticker, Martin and Marcel van Ackeren. 2018. “The Demandingness of 
Beneficence and Kant’s System of Duties” Social Theory and Practice 44.3: 405-
436. 
Unger, Peter. 1996. Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Walzer, Michael. 1977. Just and Unjust Wars, 4th edition. New York: Basic Books. 
Wolf, Susan. 1982. “Moral Saints” Journal of Philosophy 79.8: 419-439. 
